Gray C. S, theory of strategy, 2018

Tactics are always and solely about the actual conduct of military action, on any scale and for any purpose, employing weapons of any character

Operations are always about the direction, indeed the orchestration, of any milicaty action (tactics).

Strategy is about (political) consequences of tactical and operational military behaviour. (because strategy is most profoundly about consequences, there can be no such phenomenon as a strategic action”).

“periods of peace are not novelties invented and practiced only in the modern word. It is depressing to recognize that the history of our species has been all but shattered from time to time by great wars”.

Gray seems to value the key general less than the system.

Clausewitz got it wrong by only using contemporary situations to draw a general theory.

Probably the single most useful navigation aid for the researcher and theorist is the elementary conceptual triad comprising Ends, Ways, and Means. When the ideas of Assumptions and Consequences are added ot he core three we have the rather bare basis of a usable method for exploring.

“political ends, served by strategic ways, employ military means with the whole activity largely governed by relevant assumptions”.

“grand strategy is understood intelligently as a very occasional aspiration conceived and effected for a particular, extraordinary case of state need”

His general theory does not account for nuclear weapons.

1. Grand strategy is the direction and use made of many or all the assets of a security community including its military instrument for the purposes of policy decided at the political level.
2. Military strategy is the direction and use made of force and the threat of force fo the purposes of policy decided at a political level
3. Strategy is the only bridge that connects policy and its politics with military power.
4. Strategic effect is a concept as essential and elusive as it has become unduly commonplace often in misuse
5. Strategy is always human
6. Strategy is not about threat and action; rather, it is about consequence of such behaviour.
7. Strategy needs an enemy
8. Chaos, adaptability and surprise are persistent features oin strategic matters
9. Strategy’s general theory is supplemented by strategics specifically for application in different environments
10. High intensity of feeling or passion is commonly an accompaniement to if not always itselfa case of war
11. Personality can figure positively or negatively in strategy, but the relevance of culture remains controversial. It is possible for culture to play a significant stragegic role
12. All societies as well as many institutions within them claim to hold to an ethical code
13. Political, including diplomatic engagement is complement to strategy
14. Intelligence and deception are permanent features in the character of strategy
15. The relative challenges differ among policy, strategy, operations and tactics
16. All strategy is based on some assumptions
17. Strategy do not change, but implementing operations and tactics certainly does
18. Strategy always has geographical contex with political meaning
19. Technology for weapons does not win wars but it can usually help significantly.
    1. “Weapons are no more than tactical tools that must have some strategic consequence in use, great or small”.
    2. “The strategist in all ages has recognized the potential value of a technical lead over an enemy”
    3. While there is virtue in a quest after the best technical answer to ssentially technical problems, strategically focused communities need ot recognize that the technology best suited to operation in the field of probable action is that known and trusted by troops to be good enough.
    4. Technologists always strive to advance system performance because that is what they have been educated to do.
    5. What [the strategist] seeks are affordable weapons for both offence and defence that soldiers only average in competence and motivatin can use when tired.
    6. Had military technology alone been sufficient to achieve victory in the land war, then Germany would have been victorious. The truly appaling Germany political cause was beyond rescue even by the imperiously unmatched quality of the panther tand tiger tanks in particular. Despite the fact that the Wehrmacht conducted itself with superior operational art, tactics and generalship overall, the war was so far lost politically – and therefore strategically – that no measure of technoloigical superiority culd rescue the reich.
20. All strategy has both temporary and broader historical contexts
21. Supply and movement are fundamental enablers of strategy
22. Doctrine expresses what is believed to be best contemporary practice in tactics and operations but not in strategy